Wyoming's "investigation" basically amounted to asking the books and regurgitating what the books said. This is useful information (that one may as well bet offshore from Wyoming as the effective level of regulation is comparable).
The citation of court-siding is especially telling. If one has to be physically present in Wyoming, where could one court-side, beyond the few University of Wyoming home games?
The problem with a legally secure framework for the right to restrict a succesul bettor is that it is granting a company that is not part of a free market (remember, they are licensed) the privilege to discriminate against consumers arbitrarily and at the whim of a commercial entity. This is not illegal per se, as long as the practice complies with specific contractual conditions and not, as it is now, under general terms.
Another important point is that the nature of the betting business&arquitecture, due to its formal prize structure and legitimate participatory dynamics, responds to expectations of aggregate reward over time that, with the exception of poker, do not exist in other games. Therefore, there is no conflict of interest between the economic agents: consumers and companies. In short, transparency are about balancing natural expectations with legal rights. And this involves standardizing fair&open terms and conditions
I agree, I think one solution to this is mandating posted limits (like Fanduel does currently), so even if users have different limits there is a degree of transparency.
Great article, but I think you are still too leniant. I mean, what kind of business gets to kick out people who use their product well? At the very least, the truth in adverstising angle is a no-brainer: you can't lure customers with the idea that they can win big if they are smart and then if they are smart and win big, no longer allow them to play.
Ultimately, a market-maker has a very different risk of adverse selection depending on who's on the other side of the trade. In the financial markets, we see this in Citadel, Virtu, et al uniformly giving retail traders better prices than what a hedge fund would get (retail being identified by paying the likes of Robinhood, IBKR, Fidelity, etc. for order flow). The surviving offshore books don't limit nowadays, but only do various forms of rebates and rewards for players not deemed sharp, which accomplishes the same thing.
For sportsbooks, partly because the US regulations are still very restrictive (I'm fairly sure FanDuel isn't allowed to lay off risk like locals and offshores are), the market-making and brokerage functions are consolidated so you do have this conflict.
Wyoming's "investigation" basically amounted to asking the books and regurgitating what the books said. This is useful information (that one may as well bet offshore from Wyoming as the effective level of regulation is comparable).
The citation of court-siding is especially telling. If one has to be physically present in Wyoming, where could one court-side, beyond the few University of Wyoming home games?
Well done, Isaac.
The problem with a legally secure framework for the right to restrict a succesul bettor is that it is granting a company that is not part of a free market (remember, they are licensed) the privilege to discriminate against consumers arbitrarily and at the whim of a commercial entity. This is not illegal per se, as long as the practice complies with specific contractual conditions and not, as it is now, under general terms.
Another important point is that the nature of the betting business&arquitecture, due to its formal prize structure and legitimate participatory dynamics, responds to expectations of aggregate reward over time that, with the exception of poker, do not exist in other games. Therefore, there is no conflict of interest between the economic agents: consumers and companies. In short, transparency are about balancing natural expectations with legal rights. And this involves standardizing fair&open terms and conditions
I agree, I think one solution to this is mandating posted limits (like Fanduel does currently), so even if users have different limits there is a degree of transparency.
Great article, but I think you are still too leniant. I mean, what kind of business gets to kick out people who use their product well? At the very least, the truth in adverstising angle is a no-brainer: you can't lure customers with the idea that they can win big if they are smart and then if they are smart and win big, no longer allow them to play.
Ultimately, a market-maker has a very different risk of adverse selection depending on who's on the other side of the trade. In the financial markets, we see this in Citadel, Virtu, et al uniformly giving retail traders better prices than what a hedge fund would get (retail being identified by paying the likes of Robinhood, IBKR, Fidelity, etc. for order flow). The surviving offshore books don't limit nowadays, but only do various forms of rebates and rewards for players not deemed sharp, which accomplishes the same thing.
For sportsbooks, partly because the US regulations are still very restrictive (I'm fairly sure FanDuel isn't allowed to lay off risk like locals and offshores are), the market-making and brokerage functions are consolidated so you do have this conflict.